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U.S. SPEAKER
R. Richard Newcombt
Thank you, Selma, for your kind introduction. It is truly a pleasure to be
here in Cleveland, at the kind invitation of Henry King at the Case Western
Reserve School of Law and the Canada-U.S. Law Institute.
I do find it especially gratifying to be back at my law school alma mater
and see what truly outstanding work they are doing as evidenced by the insti-
tute, this event, and the multitude of innovative international law and the
issues of the International Cox Law Center. It is very impressive.
Today I will talk about three topics. First, I will give an overview of eco-
nomic sanctions, tracing their development up to the war on terrorism and
terrorist financing, and I will spend a few minutes on how this touches global
securities risk for companies worldwide.
Finally, I will address a subject that is always of concern to U.S. compa-
nies and our allies, and it invariably comes up in discussions like these, that
is, the extent and nature of federal jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies operating abroad and how they are affected by U.S. sanc-
tions regimes. I am going to try to keep to the 20-minute time frame, but if I
do run over a minute or two, please forgive me in advance.
As you know, as Selma has pointed out, I had the very great honor having
served until recently for 18 years as the Director of Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the U.S. Treasury Department. Our job was to administer and en-
R. Richard Newcomb served as director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
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force U.S. economic sanctions and embargo programs in furtherance of na-
tional security and foreign policy goals.
Looking back at all the programs we had since 1987, when I began in this
position, we were charged with some 39 separate sanctions programs to be
implemented. At the end of the day, I certainly hope it safely can be said that
we demonstrated that sanctions can be an effective tool of U.S. foreign pol-
icy and national security.
I will also say they didn't always work as well as we might have liked,
but when they worked well, they worked very well. And we tried everything.
And by that, I mean the national security interagency group. And if that did-
n't work too well, the next time we tried something different until finally we
got better at picking what worked well and how we could make sanctions
work better. We tried everything until we got it right.
We had punitive asset freezes and protective freezes. We had comprehen-
sive sanctions. We had extraterritorial and non-extraterritorial programs. We
had asset freezes with no trade embargos. We had trade embargos with no
assets freeze. We had specific trade bans, either imports, exports or both, or
some kind of a combination. We had payment prohibitions where U.S. per-
sons were prohibited from paying taxes to embargoed foreign jurisdictions.
We had a broad use of IEEPA, a narrow use of IEEPA, a laser use of
IEEPA, and by IEEPA, I am referring to the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act.1 We had prohibitions on new investments. We required
disinvestments. We had standstill agreements and reentry licenses. We
blocked funds in aid of investigation. We blocked funds in aid of litigation.
We regulated trade in diamonds. We froze payments for highly enriched ura-
nium to prevent their attachment by creditors.
We targeted sanctions against groups, individuals, and nations. We tar-
geted narcotics traffickers, first in Columbia, then around the world, and we
targeted terrorists, terrorist supporting nations in the Middle East peace, then
those individuals and groups disrupting the Middle East peace process, then
Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and then all terrorists worldwide.
And, of course, Congress always got into the act to provide guidance on
what we did. So in addition to the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, we had the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,2 the Cuban Democ-
racy Act,3 the Berman Amendment,4 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
1 Int'l Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1977) [here-
inafter IEEPA].2 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1986), repealed
by South African Democratic Transition Support Act, Pub. L. No. 103-149, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1503.
3 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1992) [hereinafter Cuban
Democracy Act].
4 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502(a), 1988
(Vol. 31 ]
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Penalty Act,5 the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,6 the Helms-Burton Act,7 the
Trade Sanctions Reform Act, 8 the Narcotics Kingpin Act, 9 the Judicial Re-
view Commission,° and the 911 Commission," to name just a few.
We had unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions. We worked with a
multitude of foreign governments and international organizations: the UN,
NATO, the EU, the OECD, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), the OAS,
to create dialogue, provide technical assistance and ensure uniformity in im-
plementation and enforcement. And we traveled to visit target states, front
line states and our allies. We imposed sanctions; we lifted sanctions; we fine-
tuned, tightened, loosened, and re-imposed sanctions.
And we blocked every conceivable kind of property: billions, tens of bil-
lions of dollars of assets, office buildings, direct and portfolio investments,
ships, vessels, art collections, oil on the high seas, oil in storage containers,
foreign banks and financial services, homes, cars, warehouses, letters of
credit, banker's acceptances and military equipment. And we licensed every
conceivable kind of transaction: oil for food, travel, imports, exports, major
league baseball games, sports events, project finance, construction projects,
humanitarian relief for natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricane, and
famine. We licensed oil pipelines and refineries. We even once licensed a
foreign head of state.
And we opened domestic offices outside of Washington. We had foreign
offices with attaches at U.S. Embassies in Bogoti, Columbia, Mexico City,
and Manama, Bahrain. We placed staff at the military combatant commands
at CENTCOM in Florida, PACOM in Hawaii, EUCOM in Germany, and
yes, we had an office in Miami, Florida to oversee the enforcement sanctions
on Cuba.
In the United States, economic sanctions over the last two decades have
emerged as one of the principal tools of foreign policy, not always to the
agreement of our allies. We are very fortunate to have IEEPA, the Interna-
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107.
5 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1214.
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (1996), amended by ILSA Exten-
sion Act of Aug. 3, 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 [hereinafter Iran-Libya Sanctions Act].
7 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§
6021-6091 (1996).
8 Trade Sanctions Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387.
9 Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act of 1999, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1999)
[hereinafter Kingpin Act].
10 21 U.S.C. § 1908(g) (establishing the Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset
Control).
11 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, §§ 601-611
(establishing the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission)).
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tional Emergency Economic Powers Act as our basic implementing statute.
No other country has anything like it, and we are unique. Under this statute,
the President has very broadly delegated authority from the Congress to regu-
late economic transactions of any nature whatever by U.S. persons, very
broadly defined, wherever in the world they are located, in times of national
emergency.' 2
The President has the authority under the statute to declare a national
emergency because of a threat from outside of the United States to the na-
tional security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. 13 Simultane-
ously, with the declaration of a national emergency, he issues an Executive
Order, which contains the terms and requirement that all U.S. persons as a
matter of law must follow with regard to the subject or target of the order,
whether it be a nation, a terrorist group, a narcotics kingpin, or any person or
entity determined to be an agent or affiliated with the target.' 4 The order of
the state of emergency must then be renewed annually as well as an annual
report sent to the Congress. 15
Under this authority, the President can then shape a program to meet the
particular needs of the national security crisis that he believes the country
faces. The actions I mentioned at the outset are among the many options that
are available and have been used over time. As each program is shaped at
different times by different people to address different problems, no two pro-
grams are ever exactly the same, often to the dismay of companies and our
allies.
IEEPA, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, was passed
by Congress and signed into law by the President in 1977.16 It was the suc-
cessor statute to the Trading with the Enemy Act, which dates back to the
World War I and World War II eras.' 7 It is the statute that had been used for
the economic sanctions up until IEPPA and the authority used to promulgate
the sanctions against Cuba from 1963 until the present. 18
There are several differences between the two statutes, but for today's
purposes as a practical matter, the principal difference is that the Trading
with the Enemy Act has been traditionally applied extraterritorially to in-
12 IEEPA, supra note 1, at § 1701(a)(1).
13 Id. at§ 1701.
14 id.; See also generally What Is An Executive Order?,
http://www.thisnation.com/question/040.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (discussing the use of
states of emergency).
15 IEEPA, supra note 1, at § 1703.
16 See generally 2 ECON. PERSPECTIVES (September 1997), available at
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/ej/ijee0997.pdf.
7 Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § 5 et seq. [hereinafter TWEA].
18 See generally What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo, available at
http://www. treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/tl I cuba.pdf.
[Vol. 3 1 ]
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elude all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies incorporated and operating outside of the United States -
a source of some irritation to many of our allies.
I will speak more about this later, but as I look back, sanctions in the
modem era have evolved in what I would describe as four stages. Stage one
would be the period of 1977 to 1990, the - let me call it for our discussion
purposes - the getting-to-know-you process.
First, there was Iran, the hostage crisis of 1979. Fifty-two U.S. nationals
were taken hostage, and the Iran finance minister threatened to withdraw its
considerable U.S. deposits.1 9 The United States responded with the freeze of
Iran's assets, which ultimately proved to be some $12 billion dollars of funds
and other property. 20 The program was very successful. We got the hostages
back, and the U.S. private corporate and bank claims were settled with Iran
100 cents on the dollar.
The Algiers accords between the United States and Iran, 21 which was the
basis for the release of the hostages, set up the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
which is functioning today as the largest and most successful program of its
kind ever. Then followed a series of other programs, where sanctions were
used, now with this new tool, IEEPA, with varying degrees of success: Nica-
ragua, South Africa, Libya, Iran again, and Panama.
The Congress was also getting into the act by this time, seeing what sanc-
tions could do. Senator Mack from Florida, coming to the aid of the powerful
Cuban-American National Foundation, proposed to restrict our ability (i.e.
OFAC's) to issue licenses to foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. companies for
buying and selling goods to Cuba when certain criteria were met.23
It had become a brisk trade amounting to nearly a billion dollars, and see-
ing what sanctions could do, they wanted them applied more strictly to Cuba.
The so-called Mack Amendment, first introduced in 1989, the subject of con-
siderable debate, was finally passed into law several years later as part of the
Cuba Democracy Act.24
19 See generally The Hostage Crisis In Iran,
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/hostages.phtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
o See Iran Hostage Crisis, available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ir/Iranhost.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005).
21 Algiers Accords, Jan. 20, 1981, U.S.-Alg.-Iran, 20 I.L.M. 224.
22 See generally Treasury Office Of Foreign Assets Control Director R. Richard Newcomb
S. Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs Committee,
http://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997 h/s97103 ln.htm.
23 See generally Harry L. Clark, Dealing With U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions And Foreign
Countermeasures (1999), available at
htt://www.dbtrade.com/publications/extra-territorial.pdf
'4 Cuban Democracy Act, supra at note 3, at § 6005(a).
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During this same time period - I am talking about '77-90 - programs
were also being lifted and Vietnam, an old Trading with the Enemy Act pro-
gram was being lifted as were others, South Africa, Panama, and Nicara-
gua.25
The Soviet Union had fallen, peace had broken out. There was even talk
that the United States might lift sanctions on Cuba when suddenly on August
2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait.
26
This began what I describe as Phase II, the Internationalization process,
which lasted from approximately August 1990 to 1995. Since the now former
Soviet Union was no longer around to veto proposed action of this nature, the
lead that President Bush took that warm summer night was soon followed a
week later in the UN. And now, not since World War II was there a truly
comprehensive coordinated multilateral embargo - in this case, against Iraq
and also against Kuwait,27 as a protective measure, UN resolution 661 began
the process for a broad coalition using sanctions as a diplomatic tool.
28
It now appeared sanctions were here to stay, and the UN began participat-
ing in other programs, targeting Serbia in 1992,29 and tightening it in 1993.30
It also developed programs against Haiti in response to a stolen election,3'
Libya following the discovery that it had been involved in the bombing of
Pan Am 103 that crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland.32
But the sanctions committee at the UN, largely a licensing body at this
time, became bogged down in the multitude of the inevitable tradeoffs that
such a body must address at the request of member nations wishing to sup-
port their companies seeking licenses. Then in 1995 - in both March and in
1995 - in both March and May, the U.S. again imposed sanctions against
Iran for its support of terrorism and terrorist activities. 33 Congress got into
25 See generally Cuban Assets Control Regulations: Publication of Economic Sanctions
Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. pt. 501 (2003), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/enfguide.txt (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
6 See generally On This Day: Aug. 2,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/2/newsid-2526000/2526937.stm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005).
27 See Use Of Sanctions Under Chapter VII Of The UN Charter: Iraq,
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/iraq.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Use of Sanc-
tions].
28 Sec. Council Res. 57/511, 1-11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
29 See generally Use Of Sanctions, supra note 28.
30 id.
31 Sec. Council Res. 933, 1-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/933 (June 30, 1994).
32 Youssef M. Ibrahim, Sanctions on Libya Likely to Fuel Qaddafi's Chaos, N.Y. TIMES,
APr. 1, 1992, at A12.
3 See Iran's Advantage: The Country Holds Ten Percent of the World's Proved Oil Re-
serves, ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2005, at 213.
[Vol. 31 ]
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the act and passed ILSA, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,34 in support of the
perceived windfall that this was affording to foreign companies, especially
oil companies.35 Under this statute, the President was required to impose two
or more sanctions out of a prescribed menu of six possible sanctions against
any foreign person (U.S. persons were already prohibited by the March 1995
Executive Order against Iran) that, through an investment of $40 million
dollar or more, "directly or significantly contributed to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources in Iran."36 The statute also had a
waiver provision that permitted the President to waive this if he determined it
to be in the national interests to do so. 37 He used this waiver authority often.
In effect, after the administration had prevented a U.S. oil company from
completing its contract with Iran to develop its South Pars oil field, the U.S.
Congress decided that sanctions would be used as a tool to ensure that no
other foreign company did it either. This really got the back up of our allies
whose oil companies wanted this work.
But the ire for this type of extraterritorial reach probably reached its apo-
gee with the Helms-Burton Act38 enacted after the shoot down of the Broth-
ers to the Rescue plane over international waters by the Government of Cuba
in 1996.39 Under this act, a private right of action was established under U.S.
law for U.S. nationals against foreign entities and individuals to recover
treble damages from those who traffic in the property which was confiscated
from them by Fidel Castro.40 Additionally, the State Department was re-
quired to deny a visa to a trafficker in such confiscated property.4 ' The term
"trafficker" included the company involved in the activity, its officers, and
their immediate family members.42
By this time, the U.S. business community was really getting its back up
about the seemingly unrelenting and unstoppable pace of ever new sanctions
programs from the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States
and international bodies.
It cried "no more," and this began a third phase, "sanctions reform," and a
new idea emerged, "targeted financial sanctions." This was to last for about
34 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, supra note 6.
35 Government Developments, OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 2, 2004, at 7.
36 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, supra note 6.
37 Id.
38 See Lissa Weinmann, Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy, WORLD POLICY J., Apr. 1,
2004, at 22.
39 David Rivera, Grill the GOP's 2008 Presidential Hopefuls, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 10,
2005, at A22.
40 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 22 U.S.C. § § 6021-6091
(1996).
4' 22 U.S.C. § 6032(e) (1996).
42 See id. at §6032 (defining "traffics" as used in the statute).
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six years from about 1995 to 2001. Of course, all these dates are rough ap-
proximations. During this time period, literally dozens or more think tanks,
study groups, Congressional committees looked at how sanctions could be
reformed and shaped so they were not proliferated at such a feverish pace
and they could be more targeted.43 International conferences, like the Swiss
Government's "Interlaken Process," became the first of a series of "Smart
Sanctions" dialogues with scholars and Government officials from around
the world to address the question. Everyone agreed that smart sanctions were
the best way forward, but there was a clear lack of consensus on the direction
of the way forward and how to do it. In fact, I suspect that at the time that
few of the multitude of those offering opinions on the subject really under-
stood the full ramifications of what was at stake and what they were advocat-
ing.
This targeted sanctions craze had been partly answered by the model de-
veloped and successfully used by President Clinton in 1995, first against
those disrupting the Middle East peace process and then against the Cali Car-
tel in Columbia - the so-called "specially designated terrorists" (SDT) 44 and
"specially designated narcotic trafficker" (SDNT) 45 programs. The SDNT
program, in particular, was wildly successful and was the model for the for-
eign narcotics Kingpin Designation Act of 2000.46 This process was also
adopted in the Antiterrorism Act of 199647 where the Executive branch, Jus-
tice, State, and Treasury began the Foreign Terrorist Organization, or the
FTO, designation process, naming on a biennial basis the worldwide terrorist
organizations currently involved in terrorist activity, and, thus, prohibiting
fundraising on their behalf and freezing their funds in the United States.48
We were moving more and more by this time into the counter terrorism
arena, especially in the wake of the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-
es-Salam. Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda were named in 1999 as especially
designated terrorists, 49 and the first of a series of trips was begun in the Mid-
dle East to consult with our allies, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, about
steps to be taken to disrupt the flow of funds to terrorist groups and the fund-
43 See Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36
NEW ENG. L. REv. 957, 960-962 (2002); see also L. Kirk Wolcott, Seeking Effective Sanc-
tions, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 351, 355-356, 362-363.
44 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
45 Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995).
46 Kingpin Act, supra note 9.
4' 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1996), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
48 id.
49 Kevin Johnson, Two Names Placed on List of "Ten Most Wanted, " USA TODAY, Jun. 8,
1999, at 03A.
[Vol. 311]
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ing of terror.5 0 There were also rumblings, especially following the chance
discovery by an alert U.S. Customs agent on the northwest border of the U.S.
of an attempted import from Canada of the materials for the bombing of Los
Angeles Airport, the so-called "millennium plot" of New Years 2000, 51 that a
more systematic public approach must be taken to target terrorist activity and
terrorist financing. This led to the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Asset
Tracking Center, which first began its life at OFAC.
This leads me to the fourth period of sanctions development, 2001 to the
present. Our world changed dramatically with the events of September 11 th,
when suddenly, we were called upon to administer economic sanctions
(along with all other UN member states) against a new kind of target: Osama
Bin Laden, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups acting worldwide on what
was soon thereafter described as the "global war on terrorism." Working with
other key elements of our Government law enforcement, intelligence, and the
military communities and very closely with our allies, the financial war on
terror seeks to disrupt the flow of funds to and business relationships and
transactions of any nature whatever with terrorist groups, their members and
their support structure; that is, all individuals and entities that are owned or
controlled by, act for or on behalf of, provide material, financial, or techno-
logical support for or otherwise proi'ide assistance to these groups. These
terms are very broadly defined and seek to affect any and all business rela-
tionships by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The United States maintains
lists of these persons, and, whenever appropriate because sufficient evidence
has been developed, submits these names to the UN for multilateral enforce-
ment action under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333,52
1363, 53 and other resolutions that followed.
Due to the transnational nature of the terrorist infrastructure, support and
cooperation with our allies is a critical part of making all enforcement initia-
tives, including multilateral designation actions, successful. By developing
and establishing authorities and procedures for entities associated with al
Qaeda to be submitted to the UN, together we have institutionalized on a
global scale the importance of sanctions as a critical tool against the terrorist
support networks.
Terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and many others
rely on their infrastructure for support and to shield their activities from scru-
tiny. The funds necessary for the support of their infrastructure are substan-
so John Diamond, Defense Secretary Begins tour of Skeptical Gulf States, Associated
Press, Mar. 5, 1999.
51 Sam Skolnik & Paul Shukovsky, Ressam: Seattle No Target, Convicted Terrorist Says
Bomb Was Intended for L.A. Airport, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 2001, at Al.
52 S.C. Res. 1333, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (December 19, 2000).
53 S.C. Res. 1363, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001).
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tial. The secretive nature of their activities and their frequent reliance on
charitable, humanitarian, educational, and religious cover are vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by making designations as specially designated global
terrorists. This prohibits U.S. persons, and, when coordinated with the UN,
the world at large, from transactions or dealings with designated individuals
and entities. Decisive action against high impact targets by the U.S. and UN
and others deters others, forcing key modes of financial support to choose
between public exposure of support for terrorist activity or tarnishing their
reputation to the detriment of their business and commercial interests.
From a corporate governance perspective, being in compliance with these
multilateral legal requirements - in other words, making sure that no busi-
ness is done directly or indirectly with these named parties - is of critical
importance. It is also of critical importance that when any party is conducting
business within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, that all
legal requirements with respect to sanctioned and embargoed parties are met.
Otherwise, civil or criminal penalties could apply.
54
But especially in a post 9/11 era, pressure is also mounting from many
different directions that there may be a need for more than a mere letter of
the law compliance attitude. Shareholders, regulators, corporate officers,
directors, pension fund managers, politicians, and the public at large are be-
coming sensitized and aware more and more of how corporate decisions
about who, where, and how they do business may affect their lives and the
lives of others. They are becoming aware of the power they have to affect
these decisions through private actions by such methods as boycotts, disin-
vestment campaigns, and lawsuits. And though there may be no per se legal
requirement to follow a particular course of action, the court of public opin-
ion may heavily influence such action. This is a major new challenge for the
future for the business community worldwide.
Consider, for example, in doing business with a terrorist supporting coun-
try that products sold to it become a component part of a product that causes
mass destruction that results in the deaths of hundreds of people. That com-
pany could find themselves as a Defendant in a court in a wrongful death
action. Win or lose, the representational harm could be enormous, and the
loss could conceivably do irreparable harm to the company.
Consider another example of a Third Country bank that allegedly holds
accounts and transfers money on behalf of a known terrorist organization,
and that organization is responsible for the death of innocent parties, the
families of whom bring lawsuits for financing of terrorist acts and the result-
ing deaths.
54 Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.§ § 2401-2420 (1976).
[Vol. 31]
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Consider an even less aggravated situation where a pension fund or a
group of pension funds decides and such-and-such a company has a particu-
larly robust business relationship involving high tech goods with a terrorist
supporting nation or is an ally of a terrorist supporting nation or that supports
a terrorist group that decides to make that fact public and dump all of its con-
siderable equity holdings.
These are but three examples of "global security risk." That is, risk that a
company faces merely by doing business in the global market place when
there is otherwise full compliance with local laws but where certain other
factors are at play. In the cases cited above, it was the involvement one way
or another with a nation or group supporting terrorism.
Call it the inevitable by-product of globalization, and in many respects it
is an expansion of sorts of the financial standards of the financial action task
force and its 48 principals into the corporate world, a sort of expanded the
"know your customer" rule. This applies to the U.S. business community
conduct of business worldwide as well as the companies of many other major
industrial nations.
And when doing business in high risk areas - that is countries known to
support or provide assistance to terrorist groups - certain extraordinary steps
are necessary to ensure to the greatest extent possible that sound business
judgment is exercised in all respects in the decision-making process, irre-
spective as to whether as a legal matter they are subject to U.S. or any other
country's jurisdiction.
In this regard, I have many real life examples. I will give four, and then I
will stop. Okay. Three examples, Henry, and then I will stop.
Three large U.S. companies voluntarily pulled their subsidiaries out of
Iran because the costs were too high.55 One was the subject of a 60 Minutes
story.56 The other two were subject to inquires from the various state and
local investment arms, for example, the New York Comptroller and various
state government pension investment authorities.57
A Canadian company suffered a significant decline in share value, nearly
30 percent, because of a divestment campaign organized against it because of
its business activities associated with its operations in Sudan.
58
55 David Ivanovich, Oil-Field Firm Pulls Out of Iran, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 10, 2005
(regarding Cooper Cameron Corp.).
56 Lesley Stahl, Doing Business with the Enemy, CBS NEWS, Jan. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/27/60minutes/main639003.shtml.
7 Id.
58 See Marcy Gordon, Activists Pressing Pension Funds to Divest $91 Billion in Sudan-
Related Holdings, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 14, 2004, (referring to Canadian company Talisman as
on target of the divestment campaign); but see also Correction: Pension-Funds-Sudan Story,
Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 15, 2004 (retracting report that Talisman was a subject of the campaign);
see also generally Gordon Pitts, Corporate Responsibility: CEOs Heading to Unique Global
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And now, finally, there is legislation on Capitol Hill that would require all
U.S. sanctions extended to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies when cer-
tain criteria are met, irrespective of how the issue is defined in executive
orders by respective administrations under IEEPA.
This would have been a good segue to talk about federal jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and their dealings with U.S. sanc-
tioned countries, but I will stop here, and if any of you would like to ask the
question, I will go through that at a later time, but it has been my pleasure to
have the opportunity to talk here this morning.
MS. LUSSENBERG: Thank you, Richard.
(Applause.)
Now, Navin, over to you.
Summit, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), June 3, 2004, at B3 (reporting that Talisman had since
divested itself of dealings in the Sudan).
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